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Going Public in Latin America
It has long been recognized that the developing economies of the Latin
American countries require not only significant amounts of capital in-
vestment through foreign aid programs and international lending in-
stitutions but also large amounts of private capital. To the extent that local
savings can be tapped and channelled into productive projects the forma-
tion of capital will be intensified. Some of the problems encountered by
foreign investors who have sought to sell securities publicly in Latin
America, and techniques for solving them, were discussed at a recent
seminar at the Center for Inter-American Relations in New York, a
r~sum6 of which follows. The moderator was Frank Nattier, and the
speakers were Marvin S. Fink, Vice President of Ebasco Industries, Inc.,
Henry H. Patton, a director of Deltec Securities Cooporation, and Norman
S. Poser, Vice President of the American Stock Exchange.
MR. NATTIER:
During the past several months two principal developments in Latin
America have focussed attention on the capital markets in that area. The
earlier of these consisted of indications of a growing feeling in Latin
America that local capital and entrepreneurs should have a participation in
industrial development, and particularly in those projects which are linked
with economic integration. The indications were strongest in Mexico, but
they have been seen to a greater or lesser extent in all the countries, as well
as in such international bodies such as LAFTA, the Central American
Common Market, the Andean Group and the Inter-American Committee
for the Alliance for Progress, CLAP.
Also, the Foreign Direct Investment Regulations of the United States
provided a strong impetus to many companies to seek sources for at least
part of their capital requirements in Latin America.
There have been other developments, too, and one among them should
not be overlooked; namely, the steps which have been taken by several
countries to develop their capital markets, provide the mechanisms, furnish
inducements for savings and capital formation and related measures.
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For these reasons, I know all of us applaud the initiative taken by the
Committee on Latin American Law in setting up this discussion. I am
certain it will be of interest and benefit to all of us.
We have an outstanding panel today. I suspect that a large percentage of
the total experience in the United States on the subject we are discussing,
is sitting on my right and my left at this moment. It is going to be a
privilege, I know, for all of us to listen to them.
I would like to give you quickly our plan of procedure. First, we are
going to hear a discussion of the considerations that enter into a decision
on the part of management to seek equity capital in Latin America. Next
will be a consideration of the kinds of securities that are available and a
look at some actual securities issues. And finally, a discussion of the
regulatory aspects. All of this will come from people who have first-hand
experience and thorough knowledge.
Our first speaker is Mr. Marvin S. Fink who is Vice President of Ebasco
Industries Inc., a graduate of Clark University and Harvard Law School.
He has had extensive participation in negotiations related to investments in
a number of Latin American countries. He will talk to us, among other
things, about some of the factors that enter into management's decision to
go into the Latin American capital market.
MR. FINK:
I would like to touch upon some of the experiences we have had in
financing in Latin America and some of the problems with which we have
been confronted in this problem of raising capital on two planes: first, as a
utility company operating in Latin America-facing the problems of
inflation and its deterrent effects on the ability to raise capital locally,
except in those countries where there was a hard currency; and especially
the inability to raise the debt capital essential for utilities operation in an
inflationary climate. Then the other part of our experience, the making of
equity and other investments in certain countries where we had disposed of
our utility properties and had embarked upon new ventures together with
other American industrial corporations and local capital; and then the sale
of stock to the public in these new ventures, which were started without
public participation, after they had developed an earnings base and had
gone through the start-up experience.
I think that the first question that is presented is, is it desirable to go
public? If you are organizing a new company in Latin America, and this
would be true of most countries, would you want to bring the public into
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the picture where you may have a three-year construction program and a
two-year period of financial sterility; where you can't pay dividends; where
it takes perhaps five years to get the enterprise really operating on a going
basis. Do you want to attract a large number of public investors who will
be disturbed by the lack of a return on their investment during the start-up
period and hence shy away from other capital formations? When capital
markets are sufficiently developed to the point where investors are sophis-
ticated and realize that investments made at the beginning of a venture may
be productive many years later and the return may be much greater and are
willing to take their chances, then you may seek public financing in the
developmental period as in countries with highly developed capital mar-
kets. I don't believe that situation exists to any great extent in the Latin
American countries. The result then is that if you are forming a new
corporation and you want to meet the objective of having local capital
participation, you will generally seek to have knowledgeable partners in the
local country with the intention that later on, either you or they or both of
you, will sell shares to the public when the enterprise has matured. Among
the advantages of having knowledgeable local investors in the initial stages
are that they go into the venture understanding that they will not receive
dividends initially; that they contribute managerial talent; and that you
have a pool of financial resources, since practically every venture you start
costs more than you anticipated at the beginning and you have to go to the
well more than once in order to raise the necessary capital.
Another reason for raising local capital privately, in addition to those
mentioned, is that it may be necessary to have local partners to meet the
standards of the host country, either imposed by legislation or by practice,
requiring either a majority or substantial local ownership of the enterprise.
Such a requirement is not an idle one because the granting of tax relief
available in many countries for new and developing industry depends upon
local capital participation and not only would tax relief be unavailable
without local capital participation, but the obtaining of the necessary gov-
ernmental authorizations, licenses and so forth essential to the business
could be made more difficult.
With that rather long-winded introduction, it may be worth looking at
two ventures that we went into in Mexico where we were required to
reinvest some $63,000,000 out of a purchase price of $68,000,000 paid to
us by the Mexican government on the sale of our utility properties in that
country. This money was to be paid to us over a period of 15 years with
interest of 6/2%, and all payments have been made as scheduled. We
agreed that we would reinvest this amount as received in other businesses
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in Mexico. In that way, there would not be disinvestment of Mexican
capital and, on our part, we would have other investments which we
believed would be, and which have proven, more profitable than the utility
business had been in Mexico.
The first venture in which we became engaged was made together with a
major American industrial company and a Mexican financial group. The
project involved the construction of a plant in Mexico costing about $16.8
million. The operation came under the Mining Law which requires 51%
Mexican control. The financing was arranged, $6.5 million from Eximbank,
$3.8 million from us in debentures junior to the Export-Import Bank, $3.8
million of preferred stock which the American company took jointly with
the Mexican partners, and $3 million in common stock divided 51% Mexi-
can, 35% for the American company and 14% to us. The plant took about
a year and a half to build and another year and a half before it was on a
dividend paying basis. Early in the operation, the Mexican financial group,
who weren't really interested in holding the preferred stock, sold that stock
to the Mexican public together with a portion of the common stock. The
preferred stock was a rather unique instrument. It was a peso preferred
with a fixed dividend and a participating dividend but stabilized to the
dollar so as to protect against possible devaluation of the peso. I am happy
to say that not only has there been no devaluation, but that, in fact, over
the past five years, the Mexican peso has had one of the strongest records
of any currency. In case of the devaluation of the peso, both the dividend
rate, the redemption price and the liquidating price would be adjusted so
that the investors would have returned to them the equivalent of the
amounts invested in dollars. This was because the American industrial
company did not wish to take a peso preferred stock which at that time
appeared hazardous.
We sold our common stock to the American company later on. It cost us
100 pesos a share, we sold the stock at something like 450 pesos a share
which was approximately the price prevailing on the Mexican stock ex-
change at the time. It has been an interesting investment to the Mexican
public. It probably would not have been attractive to them had they gone in
initially and had to wait three years to see any return.
A second situation into which we entered together with a different
American industrial company was one where we each took, the American
company, our company and a group of Mexican investors, one-third of the
common stock. In this particular company, the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce insisted that in order to obtain the tax relief available that there
would have to be 60% Mexican ownership. In order to meet this provision,
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the government agreed to a disposal program on the part of the two
American companies whereby over a period of time we would sell a part of
the stock to Mexican investors, which we did and which we are still doing.
We started to sell our stock to the public in accordance with our com-
mitment after the company was on an earnings basis.
One of the ways in which Mexicanization or national ownership of a
developing industry is obtained is by having two classes of common stock,
Class A and Class B. One class is available only to Mexican investors and
the other class is available to Mexican or foreign investors. Not only is the
purchase by a foreign investor of the Mexican stock illegal, but this holding
of such stock is of no legal force.
One other aspect of these transactions, and this goes to the matter of
achieving local ownership in a new industrial situation, is, as I mentioned,
the junior debentures that we took in this first situation. One of the
problems of properly financing a new enterprise and obtaining local own-
ership is the amount of equity required to have a proper capital structure in
the light of the limited amount of local funds available. Therefore, in order
to achieve the objective of Mexican ownership and to obtain the necessary
financing, it is necessary to some degree to mongrelize the capital struc-
ture. While this increased the debt ratio beyond that deemed desirable by
financial purists, the junior debentures became an effective vehicle for
furthering Mexican ownership in that as the debentures have been repaid,
the equity value and hence the amount of local ownership has increased.
These are only a few examples of investment situations which have
proved successful. The interplay of financial and legal factors-as well as
the less tangible but not less real psychological aspects of the local in-
vesting community-present extremely interesting problems. I think it is
fair to say that, while the conditions existing in the Latin American coun-
tries are vastly different from those in the infinitely larger and more sophis-
ticated U.S. financial markets-for example, consider the question of creat-
ing convertible securities or option warrants under a legal regime that does
not recognize authorized but unissued capital stock,-with ingenuity these
difficulties can be met and met with results that are gratifying for all
concerned.
MR. NATTIER:
Our second speaker is Mr. Henry Patton, who is Vice President of
Deltec Pan Americana, and a director of Deltec Securities Corporation.
Mr. Patton has had long experience in the securities field, particularly
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3
458 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
having to do with Latin America. He has lived in Latin America, and is
familiar with many aspects of the way these things are done; the possi-
bilities; and the various methods that are available, which he will discuss
with us.
MR. PATTON:
I should like to start off by telling you that in January of 1966, we were
commissioned by the Inter-American Development Bank to make studies
of capital markets in Argentina, Brazil, Per and Venezuela, and we
undertook this gladly because it gave us a chance to assemble our thoughts,
to present to the Bank our ideas on what the markets consisted of, what
was wrong with them, and how they could be improved. We hoped that this
might have some influence on the thinking of the governments in the
various countries. We delivered these about a year later after considerable
sweat and they have now been published. I should say that there were two
others that were done by Professor Bach, up-dated versions of earlier
studies he had made on Colombia and Mdxico. I believe they have been
published too. Those are available through the Bank or through the pub-
lishers in Mexico. They contain just about everything that we know and
about everything we think that should be done.
We (Deltec) are in seven countries in Latin America-Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Perb, Mdxico and Venezuela. To begin with, there are
only certain of those countries in which any foreign or any domestic
company can go public. It is simply impossible in some of them. One can in
Argentina and Brazil, M6xico certainly, and, to an extent, Venezuela. It is
literally impossible in the other countries where we have an office-Chile,
Colombia and Per6. The reason is that there simply isn't any market for
securities. You cannot sell them where there is no market, and I mean no
old market or new market or embryonic market. I should take that back in
Chile. At one point there was, but I would say in the last five or seven
years or so it has been pretty well killed. The reason for that is the
galloping inflation and an attitude on the part of the government towards
capitalism as we know it. Where it can be done, it can only be done in a
limited way. One shouldn't confuse what can be done here or in many
countries in Europe. It is just on a different scale.
Venezuela
To cover the least of the markets first, Venezuela. It is not possible to
sell equity in Venezuela at this time. You can sell with relative ease three,
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four, or five hundred thousand or maybe a million to believers in debt
securities. One reason is the state of the currency. They have no inflation
and there is confidence in fixed income securities. The equity market
blossomed briefly, I believe it was in the early 60's, but unfortunately they
had all kinds of excesses and the market collapsed. It all left a bad taste
and they have just never gotten over it. There is another peculiar difficulty
in Venezuela which does not exist in any other country. Two stock ex-
changes grew up in this embryonic capital market, one in Caracas and one
in Miranda, actually the same place. They compete with each other and
they cut each other's throat successfully so that the brokerage fraternity
slowly starves to death there, and what little vitality the securities markets
have there they manage to diminish. It should come back, and it is some-
what of a puzzle to us as to why it doesn't. There is plenty of money
available. Business by and large, as you all know, is very successful there
so the failure of a good securities market to develop is somewhat of a
mystery.
M xico
M6xico is at the other extreme, and of course it is the outstanding
garden spot for securities, both equities and debt in all of Latin America.
As Marvin Fink said, they have had a stable currency for at least 15 years.
The year 1954 was the date of the last devaluation and before that going
many years back they had a flourishing economy. They have a good stock
exchange. And I would say today that there are several investment
banking firms to whom you could go to raise securities there. They happen
to be commercial banks, one of them is Banco Comercial and the other is
Banco Nacional, and then ourselves, and I think there are two or three or
four stockbrokerage firms that are doing a good job. That is a lot in Latin
America.
Incidentally, I should say at this point that Deltec would be delighted to
welcome two or three or twenty-two good solid securities firms anywhere.
We would welcome the competition. Where we are the only securities
company it is a pretty good indicator that there isn't very much business to
go around. It also is uncomfortable to be conspicuous and we all know you
just cannot do this job of developing a capital market all by yourself.
Argentina
Argentina has a mature stock exchange, one of the best. The mechanism
there is excellent. There are several dozen stockbrokers there; I won't
differentiate between the stockbroker and investment banker. They can be
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quite different although they overlap. There are in Argentina, I would say,
three banking firms as we know them, Tornquist, Roberts & Co., Holt
Ruffin & Co. and ourselves, and then there are one or two dozen stock-
brokers with considerable financial knowlege. The market there was killed
in the days of Per6n and it has taken a long time before it could come back.
Today, in theory, you could go public in Argentina. In practice, I don't
know how you could because the blue chip stocks on the Buenos Aires
Stock Exchange are selling anywhere from a third to a tenth of their book
value, anywhere from two to eight times earnings and I really don't know
how a new company or even an existing company can profitably finance
publicly since you have to issue some securities in competition with what
already exists.
The Argentine market has been in the doldrums for years but in the last
few months it has shown signs of renewed vitality. There has been a
considerable amount of foreign capital going into the market down there,
which is typical of a resurgence of foreign confidence in advance of the
local people who are still in a state of financial shock. But at some point if
the market continues to improve, it will bring back confidence, and the time
will come, I hope and think not too far off, when it will be possible to
finance publicly on terms and a scale comparable to earlier days.
The Argentine government has sold two bond issues recently which
were very successful and actually greatly over-subscribed. I think they
yield about 11% which is fair in terms of the domestic economy, domestic
interest rates and the reduced rate of inflation.
Brazil
Brazil is the country where we have been the longest, since 1948, where
our fortunes have gone up and down with the state of the capital market
and at some points in the past it has been really remarkable. Henry
Balgooyen here and Marvin Fink, who have done a lot with American &
Foreign Power there, sold a lot of securities, and I mean a lot, in the
millions, on a very large and good basis. The public's experience has been
good with fairly priced public utility preferred shares and in addition to that
a great many industrial issues have been placed. We have made a lot of
studies on this, and looking back during the period of galloping inflation in
Brazil in the last 12 to 15 years, people have just about beaten inflation by
investing in a cross-section of common stocks in Brazil. That is a pretty
good record. Nothing else except good real estate could possibly equal that
performance. During the Goulart time, of course, this went absolutely flat.
For example, at the height of our activity there we had a sales force of
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more than 400 people and in 1962 we were down to a total work force in
our entire company of 15 people, and we were about ready to take our
shingle down. Luckily we didn't, and we are gradually building back up
again, and so it goes with the stock market itself. There are good stock
exchanges there, one in Rio, one in Sao Paulo. Brazil has a new capital
market law which is excellent and there has been a resurgence of activity. I
wish every country in Latin America would get a copy of it and produce
something like it, tailored to their own needs. Throughout the inflation, a
great many securities dealers continued to deal in letras de cambio, maybe
200 of them, and many of them were very capable financially. They are
moving back into the securities business. In addition there are the in-
vestment banks there which are a somewhat different breed of cat. The
Citibank has one and we have one. I guess there are half a dozen very
competent ones, quite capable of bringing the company to the public.
Now I would like to endorse what Marvin Fink said with respect to a
new enterprise going public in Latin America. I really don't care who it is.
Whether it is Ebasco or a brand new company or General Motors, there is
a period that every company goes through when it costs at least something
more than was ever expected to get into production. It usually takes more
time than the gloomiest forecast. In addition, there often are growing pains
so there is a sterile period. Believe me, this experience has been repeated
over and over again. The big corporations are accustomed to this. They
live through it, they sweat, they don't like it, they have to go back to
Detroit and confess what has happened and get some more money and we
have all been through this-I see several of you grinning-and if you can
take it and you have the sophistication to realize this has happened before
in other places, it is all very well. But, if you go to the public, no matter
how many times you tell them all these facts and how careful you are to
point out what the pitfalls may be and the waiting period may be, they
never really believe it. So when the inevitable happens, you have a lot of
disappointed stockholders and this is about the worst thing that could
happen to any foreign company going into Latin America or anywhere else.
Deltec, as a rule, will not finance publicly any new enterprise in Latin
America. Now please understand that's publicly. We will be glad to join
with anybody in setting up the plans for a new program and getting a few
other partners, sophisticated people or small groups and so forth, but to
talk about going out and selling stock publicly, I don't think we would do it
for a new enterprise. Now there is one outstanding exception to that which
we did with Industrias Kaiser in Brazil. Starting from zero we went out and
sold stock to a total of 40,000 stockholders in every hamlet in Brazil, and it
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has worked out extremely well, and they have been, I think, very happy
stockholders. Most of them have their original stock that they bought in
1956. So that is a long record and it is a good record. The Kaiser stock has
gone up and down, paid dividends and they have had good years and some
mediocre years. But on the whole this particular operation did work out
extremely well. I happened to say to Clarence Dauphinot this morning "do
you think we can do that again?" and he said "well, if I were 15 years
younger, we would do it again, but today I don't know." In the case of the
Kaiser financing we were accused of being snake oil salesmen; we had a
bunch of jeeps painted orange and yellow. We went out and put lights on
them, had a guy playing a trombone over the tail gate and we really made
an old fashioned sales pitch. Well it worked but I really don't think we
want to do that again; I really would not recommend it even on a modest
scale.
MR. NATTIER:
We will now assume that the decisions have been made first to offer
shares to the public, and then as to the kind of securities to use. At an early
stage, and all through the operation, the company must contend with the
regulatory authorities of the country in which they are operating. Our next
speaker is highly familiar with this area of the subject. Mr. Norman Poser
is now Vice President of the American Stock Exchange, and was formerly
with the S.E.C. A short while ago he spent six months in Brazil, working as
a consultant to the Central Bank in connection with the new capital market
law to which Henry Patton referred. He has written an article on that law
which is one of the best available in English. It is a great pleasure to have
Norman with us and I am sure we are going to be very much interested in
what he has to say.
MR. POSER:
I would like to tell you something about the Brazilian effort to regulate
its securities markets, which began about four years ago and is still in the
process of development.
The underlying reasons for regulating the markets'in Brazil were quite
different from those which led to the new deal legislation in this country
during the 1930's. Our securities regulation was designed to protect the
investors and to avoid repetition of the economic disasters which, in part,
had resulted from market excesses. The Brazilian government, on the other
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hand, is using securities regulation as a means of fostering the development
of the country's capital markets and in that way of the economy generally.
Protection of investors is an important part of this program, since the
public is unlikely to be willing to put its savings into equity or long-term
securities unless it has confidence that the markets are honest and unless
information is available concerning the operations and finances of the
issuers of securities.
In addition, the Brazilian government is aiding the securities market of
that country in other ways. First it has granted certain tax advantages to
companies which go public and to their stockholders. I will say a few
words about that in a few minutes. It has also authorized government
subsidies to enable stock exchanges to change their method of trading from
the old-fashioned call method on which stocks are called out in order once
or twice every trading session. That was based on the method used in the
Paris Bourse in the 1890's, which has since been changed in Paris but until
recently wasn't changed in Rio or Sao Paulo, to a continuous auction
market similar to that which we have on our major stock exchanges in this
country.
Secondly, Brazil has authorized the creation of certain new institutions,
such as private investment and development banks, which were mentioned
earlier, which may be effective in strengthening the capital markets; and it
has removed certain legal restraints on certain activities and institutions.
For example, until recently membership in the Rio and Sao Paulo stock
exchanges was limited by statute to 50 brokers who had an express right
by statute to hand down their exclusive franchise to engage in securities
and foreign currency dealings to their sons or their sons-in-law. Another
example of the elimination of restrictions which hampered the growth of
the markets is the provision which for the first time permits Brazilian
corporations to have authorized but unissued capital. Previously this prohi-
bition prevented companies from issuing convertible securities.
The Brazilian capital markets law, Law 4728, was adopted in July, 1965.
The capital markets law contains provisions similar to those of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 in this country, as well as various tax,
corporate, and other provisions. It bears some very definite signs of
influence of the United States pattern of securities regulation. For example,
the capital markets law does not establish precise standards of behavior but
leaves this to a regulatory agency. Until recently, that was a very unusual
situation in the world, although European countries are beginning to in-
troduce the kind of administrative agency that we have in this country. The
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National Monetary Council in Brazil, which is composed of nine opposing
officials including the Minister of Finance and the President of the Central
Bank, was authorized to establish rules in a number of areas including the
operation and organization of stock exchanges and broker-dealers, the type
of disclosure which companies are required to make (both on a periodic
basis and when they issue securities to the public), the operations of
private development banks, and the conditions under which public com-
panies and their stockholders can receive favored tax treatment. These
rules are administered by the Central Bank, which has established a special
office, the Office of Capital Markets, to fulfill this responsibility. Since the
National Monetary Council has no staff of its own, in practice the staff of
the Central Bank is also expected to prepare regulations and to submit
them for approval to the National Monetary Council.
The shortage of qualified staff members in Brazil has been a problem at
this office since its inception. When I was in Brazil in 1966, 1 worked on
drafting of regulations with an informal group of two or three persons, none
of whom had any official connection with the government, because there
just wasn't anyone to work with at the Central Bank. This problem may
have already been reduced through the various programs which have been
in operation in this country and in Brazil for the training of officials and
investment people, who go back to Brazil to take up their duties.
Since the capital markets law covers so much ground, I will only men-
tion a few of its provisions which may be of particular interest to you.
In October, 1966, the National Monetary Council adopted Resolution
No. 39, which deals with stock exchanges and their members. I think that,
as a practical matter, by far the most important provision of this regulation
is that it opens up membership in the stock exchanges to any qualified firm.
I understand that the Rio exchange now has more than 200 members. The
major part of the business of many of these is selling bills of exchange.
While they are continuing to sell commercial paper and short term debt, the
fact that they now have access to the stock exchanges and can now deal in
securities on an organized exchange must be a factor, and I am sure will be
a factor, in the development of the stock markets in Brazil.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Capital Markets Law require registration of the
companies whose securities are traded on a stock exchange or which issue
securities to the public. Resolution No. 88, adopted February 1, 1968,
requires the filing of certain specified information and also requires that
such companies have adequate services for their stockholders' transfer of
stock and payment of dividends and so on. The disclosure requirements are
generally far less stringent than those of the SEC in this country. The
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problem of getting adequate corporate information is further complicated
by the staff problem I spoke of before. I do not think it is possible to
predict whether these new regulations will be successful in overcoming the
traditional habits of secrecy of Brazilian industrialists. However, I do not
think that it is possible to have real public equity markets unless there is
adequate disclosure of corporate information. It seems to me that dis-
closure is not just one fact among many; it is the name of the game. Unless
people know what the company is doing, they are not going to invest,
except on a very small scale.
The final area of the Federal Markets Law which I want to mention is
the so-called open capital provisions. Articles 55 and 56 of the Law
provide that stockholders of companies with "open capital" will receive
more favorable tax treatment on the dividends which they receive than will
stockholders of other companies. The term "open capital" is left to the
National Monetary Council to define. The purposes of these provisions is
to encourage wider share ownership and liquid securities markets. Thus the
definition, as originally promulgated in Resolution No. 16 (February 8,
1966), required a company with open capital both to have a broad dis-
tribution of its shares and a minimum amount of trading in its stock on a
stock exchange. The first part of that definition does not seem to raise any
problems. But the requirement that there must be a certain amount of
trading seems to give corporate management an incentive to engage in
"wash" sales of their own corporation stock just to reach the required level
of activity. In addition, this kind of a rule penalizes companies located in
the northeast of Brazil and other areas in which active stock exchanges do
not exist.
The National Monetary Council has recently taken steps to correct this
situation. Resolution No. 106, adopted on December 10, 1968, has re-
defined open capital. This regulation is important, I think, to any company
which intends to go public in Brazil. First of all, the company with open
capital is required to have a minimum number of shareholders owning at
least 20% of the outstanding stock. The number of shareholders depends
upon the amount of the capital of the company and the location of its
principal office. For example, a company with capital of more than I
million new cruzeiros, that is I think maybe half a million dollars or
less-$250,000-, which is located in Sao Paulo or Rio is required to have
at least 500 shareholders, none of whom owns fewer than 100 shares. If a
company of that size is located in Salvador, Recife, Porto Alegre or Belo
Horizonte, the medium-sized cities, the requirement is reducd to 350
shareholders. If the company is located in outlying regions, and there are
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not too many public companies in those regions, the requirement is only
250 shareholders, each of whom need have only 75 shares instead of 100.
Investment firms may be counted as more than one shareholder according
to a set formula.
In addition to these distribution requirements, a company with open
capital must have shares registered for trading on one or more stock
exchanges and, furthermore, the shares must be fully negotiable and certain
rules regarding the payments of dividends and filing of information with the
Central Bank must be complied with. Happily, in my opinion, the require-
ment that a minimum amount of trading take place has been eliminated.
That is a very brief description of some of the highlights of the Brazilian
effort to impose regulation, in some ways similar to that of the United
States, upon its securities markets. I think that borrowing the laws of
another country always poses some problems. It is clear to me that the full
panoply of SEC regulation is not well suited to a developing country such
as Brazil. For one thing bureaucratic proliferation may inhibit, rather than
stimulate, economic growth and it may deter persons who wish to go public
from doing so.
Yet there is evidence that the Brazilian middle class has substantial
savings that it would be willing to invest in local industries rather than in
Swiss banks if it had some real assurance that it would receive a fair shake.
During the expansive era of the 1950's which Mr. Patton referred to, many
Brazilian companies, some of them subsidiaries of U.S. corporations went
public in Brazil. I understand that the episode in some ways left something
of a sour taste, particularly because there weren't good trading markets
available where the stockholders could sell their shares later when they
wanted to. Lack of corporate disclosure and overreaching by brokers also
were factors leading to disillusion among investors.
If Brazil enters a new era of econ6mic expansion in the 1970's, the
groundwork which has been laid to adapt U.S. concepts in securities
regulation to Brazilian needs will turn out to have been extremely valuable.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3
